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THE PROBLEM OF DELIVERY IN GIFTS OF STOCK
The unique nature of securities has made it difficult for courts to decide
what acts by the donor are sufficient to effectuate a delivery of stock. It is
the purpose of this Note to analyze the guidelines set forth by the Pennsylvania
courts as to what acts are necessary to complete a gift of stock, and to present
possible solutions to some of the problems arising in this area.
DELIVERY AT COMMON LAW
In medieval times few people could read or write; the only manner in
which they could manifest their intentions was through physical actions.
Thus, the simplest way to show intent in business transactions was to have
a manual transfer occur, e.g., a transfer of a twig at the closing of a sale
of real property. This was the only way seisin could be passed. The emphasis
placed on delivery in effecting the transfer of a chattel by gift is "directly
traceable to the notion in early law, of seisin as an element in the ownership
of chattels as well as land."'
The tradition of physical delivery remains even though there is heavy
criticism by those seeking to mollify the purported rigidity of its application.
The courts find three desirable results in applying the physical delivery re-
quirement: (1) The delivery makes clear and concrete to the donor the sig-
nificance of his act; (2) the act is unequivocal to both the donor and the actual
witnesses to the transaction; (3) and the delivery presents the donee with
prima facie evidence in favor of the alleged gift.2
When the courts speak of transferring a right, they use the word delivery
to signify the legal act necessary to effect the gift of a right.3 "The nearly uni-
versal judicial view, at least in this country, holds that choses-in-action, evi-
denced by a commercial instrument, may be given by delivery of the instru-
ment."'4 Shares of stock in a corporation can be described as choses-ii-action
evidenced by a writing.5 Stock certificates evidence a bundle of rights: The
right to a portion of the profits by way of dividends, the right to a voice in
1. Rohan, The Continuing Question of Delivery in the Law of Gifts, 38 IND. L.J.
1, 4 (1902); Stone, Delivery in Gifts of Personal Property; 20 COLum. L. REv. 196
(1920).
2. Mechem, The Requirement of Delivery in Gifts of Chattels and of Choses in
Action Evidenced by Commercial Instruments, 21 ILL. L. REV. 341, 348 (1926).
3. Mechem, supra note 2, at 346 & n.6a.
4. Id. at 343.
5. Mechem, Gifts of Corporation Shares, 20 ILL. L. REv. 9, 11 (1925).
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the control of the corporation by voting for directors, and the right to share
in the assets upon dissolution.
Those who advocate the manual tradition find it difficult to justify its use
with respect to stocks. Corporations became recognized as legal entities long
after the requirement of physical delivery of gifts was part of our common
law. Naturally, intangible rights had to be represented by some physical instru-
ment. Thus, stock certificates came into existence. There are various methods
of transferring these certificates. As a result, many different situations arise,
creating a need for relaxation of the rigid common law requirement of manual
delivery. "Perhaps no other area of private law reflects so large a number of
defective transactions, split decisions and disappointing results, both in isolated
individual cases and in certain recurring categories or factual patterns."6 "The
delivery requirement is not the unitary, static norm that it is usually held out
to be and ... it cannot be equated with a manual tradition.
' 7
Attempts to make a gift of stock are conventionally classified as: (a)
delivery of the stock certificate with or without written indorsement, assign-
ment, or express written power of attorney; (b) execution and delivery of a
writing, amounting to a deed or otherwise purporting to convey the title, not
accompanied by a delivery of the certificate; and (c) a transfer on the books
of the corporation not accompanied by a delivery of the certificate. Many
combinations of these methods occur but the courts usually refer such attempts
to one of these three basic classifications.8
EVIDENTIARY PROBLtMS
Since most gifts of securities are made between related parties, there is
a rebuttable presumption that closely related persons, such as husband and
wife and parent and child, intended to make a gift when there is an unex-
plained delivery of property. 9 Necessarily, a stronger showing is required
where a gift is made to a stranger than a gift to a near relative.' 0 Where a gift
inter vivos is first asserted after the donor's death, it must be established by
clear and satisfactory evidence, clear and convincing, or clear and precise
evidence." Furthermore, parol evidence is admissible, although the donor is
6. Id. at 1.
7. Rohan, srupra note 1, at 7.
8. Mechem, supra note 5, at 13. See generally Annot., 99 A.L.R. 1077 (1935)
Annot., 23 A.L.R.2d 1173 (1952).
9. Gerlock v. Gabel, 380 Pa. 471, 112 A.2d 78 (1955) ; Jeanne v. Kennedy, 379 Pa.
555, 109 A.2d 307 (1954) ; In Re Wann's Estate, 176 Pa. Super. 498, 108 A.2d 280
(1954) ; Kaufmann's Estate, 281 Pa. 519, 127 Atl. 133 (1924).
10. Balfour v. Seitz, 392 Pa. 300, 140 A.2d 441 (1958) ; Watkins v. MacPherson,
348 Pa. 467, 35 A.2d 256 (1944) ; Brown's Estate, 343 Pa. 230, 22 A.2d 821 (1941).
11. Titusville Trust Co. v. Johnson, 375 Pa. 493, 100 A.2d 93 (1953) ; Tradesmen's
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 162 Pa. Super. 71, 56 A.2d 329 (1948) ; Fritz's Estate, 135 Pa.
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deceased, when the intention to make a gift has not clearly been manifested.12
Such evidentiary rules should be noted in dealing with cases relative to gifts
of stock.
TRANSFER OF SECURITIES BY PHYSICAL DELIVERY
Delivery of a share of stock may be effectuated by physical delivery of the
certificates, with or without written indorsement or assignment.,3 It is not
essential that there be an actual transfer of the stock on the books of the cor-
poration, or an execution of the indorsement or assignment of the certificates, 4
even though the corporation's by-laws make the certificates transferable only
upon the books of the corporation.'
5
In 1922 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania found a valid gift where a
father, contemplating a surgical operation, gave his daughter some liberty
bonds, placing them in her safe deposit box in another bank."' The daughter
retained possession of the bonds until her death about nine months later. The
father claimed the bonds stating they were a conditional gift. The court referred
to the fact that he lived with his daughter after his discharge and did not claim
the bonds, implying that the gift might have been invalid, if the delivery had
been to some one other than the father's relation.
Where the parties are strangers, the presumption against voluntary
transfers is greater than in transactions between those holding more
intimate relations. If the gift is from husband to wife or parent to
child, the action of the donor is viewed as but natural, and less evi-
dence is required to establish the intention.17
Three years later, the court stated in In Re Connell's Estate,'s that:
It is now well settled that a valid gift of non-negotiable securities may
be made by delivery of them to the donee without assignment or in-
dorsement in writing. This principle has been applied to notes, bonds,
stocks, deposit certificates and life insurance policies.' 9
In this case the stocks remained in the decedent-husband's name. However,
they were found in an envelope containing his wife's property in a safe deposit
Super. 463, 5 A.2d 601 (1939) ; Leadenham's Estate, 289 Pa. 216, 137 Atl. 247 (1927);
Davidson's Estate (No. 1), 204 Pa. 379, 54 Atl. 272 (1903).
12. Grossman's Estate, 386 Pa. 647, 126 A.2d 468 (1956).
13. Connell's Estate, 282 Pa. 555, 128 Atl. 503 (1925); Mothes' Estate, 29 Pa.
Super. 462 (1905).
14. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 A, § 8-307 (1953) ; 17 P.L.E. Gifts § 25 (1959).
15. 12A FLETCHER, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 5683 (rev. ed. 1957).
16. In re Yeager's Estate, 273 Pa. 359, 117 Atl. 67 (1922).
17. Id. at 362, 117 Ati. at 68. No attempts will be made to distinguish the cases
herein as causa mortis or inter vivos. The rules of delivery for both are the same. Is re
Elliott's Estate, 113 Pa. Super. 350, 173 Atl. 880 (1934).
18. 282 Pa. 555, 128 Atl. 503 (1925).
19. Id. at 560; 128 AtI. at 505.
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box used jointly by husband and wife. In addition, the dividends of this stock
were payable to the husband. Yet, the court held this to be t valid gift.
The appellant in Connell's Estate was the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
Seeking to tax the transfer as part of the estate, the Commonwealth argued
that either the transfer was a gift intended to take effect at or after the donor's
death, or that the gift failed entirely because of insufficient delivery. Counsel
for the Commonwealth raised this issue with respect to the effect the Uni-
form Stock Transfer Act had on the claim of the wife. It was contended that
title had not passed and that the gift failed, because delivery of the certificates
was made without indorsement.
The court answered this contention by stating that the Uniform Stock
Transfer Act was enacted for the protection of the corporation, so that it could
safely pay dividends to the persons registered on its books as the owners of
the stock.20 It was not intended, the court continued, to control the rights of par-
ties transferring stock to another, for a gift completed by delivery is effective as
of date made.21 Although the Uniform Stock Transfer Act has been replaced
20. Ibid. The court interpreted the act to prescribe that title to the certificate shall
"pass by indorsement as of the time of registration of the transfer." This statement
appears to be incorrect. Section 9 of the Uniform Stock Transfer Act considered the
delivery of unindorsed certificates and imposed on the transferor an obligation to indorse.
6 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. § 9 (1922).
Possibly, the court meant that title passes at the time of indorsement of the certifi-
cates. The court bases its statement on State v. Schofield, 136 La. 702, 67 So. 557 (1915).
There the court stated that the object of the Uniform Stock Transfer Act "is merely to
regulate the mode of transfer upon the books of the corporation, and to furnish a rule
for deciding between claimants over the ownership of the stock." Id. at 722, 67 So. at
564. From this statement the Pennsylvania Supreme Court deduced that section 9 was
"inserted for the protection of the corporation . . . but was not intended to control the
rights of the parties when one saw fit to transfer his rights to another ... and a gift com-
pleted by delivery is effective as of date made . In re Connell's Estate, 282 Pa. at
561, 128 Atl. at 506.
The ultimate conclusion reached in Connell's Estate was correct, i.e., the act of
delivery imposes a duty upon the one who had equitably assigned his interest in stock
to make a formal transfer when demanded, and that equitable title has passed. This view
has been adopted by section 3-307 of the Uniform Commercial Code. It is submitted,
however, that the court's statement as to the primary purpose of the Uniform Stock
Transfer Act is erroneous. The preface to the Uniform Stock Transfer Act states its
main purpose to be uniformity "as to the rights of the parties concerned in the transfer
of certificates." 6 UNIFORM LAW ANN. v. (1922). The statutory notes to section 1 of the
same act point to a Louisiana law which undoubtedly effected the Schofield case relied
upon by the court in Connell's Estate. That statute stated:
The person, firm or corporation, in whose name a certificate of stock stands, or
to whom a certificate of stock is endorsed, whether in full or in blank and who
has possession of said certificate, shall be regarded as the legal owner thereof
. . . and no person, corporation firm . . . shall be responsible to one claiming
any interest in, or ownership of said stock . . . by virtue of any undisclosed or
latent legal or conventional title or interest therein.
6 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. § 1 (1922).
Although it can be argued that the Uniform Stock Transfer Act protects corpora-
tions, it is submitted that this was not the primary purpose for its enactment.
21. In re Connell's Estate, 282 Pa. at 561, 128 Atl. at 506.
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by article 8 of the Uniform Commercial Code,22 the question undoubtedly will
arise under section 8-307. There can be no doubt that it will be resolved
as it was in Connell's Estate, because the Code has adopted the line of thought
expressed in that case.
2
3
These words of the donor at the time of delivery, "Remember so long
as I am living I have to collect the dividends and everything on the certificates
and I am the boss as long as I live," were not enough to defeat an otherwise
valid gift of securities in In Re Chapple's Estate.24 In this case the father had
given stocks to his son, allowing them to remain registered in the father's name.
The son gave the securities to his sister to put in her deposit box. After this
was accomplished, the father continued to tell people that he owned this stock.
The court applied the rule that when the actions at the time of the gift are
unambiguous, a donor is never permitted to impeach his gift.25 The court
further stated:
It is true that where the intention to make a gift is not clearly mani-
fested subsequent acts may aid in clarifying the intention, but where,
as here, the intention is unambiguous we must confine our inquiry to
what occurred at the time of the transaction.
26
It is well to note that all above-mentioned cases involved intra-family trans-
fers, which are buttressed by the presumption of a gift. Under similar facts
would delivery to a non-relative be effective?
A landmark case decided by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court is Tonayko
v. Carson.2 7 In Tonayko the shares of stock in question were found in a safe
deposit box that was in the name of decedent-donor and the claimant, an
employee of the decedent. The shares were in the name of the decedent and
unindorsed by him. Three witnesses testified that the donor stated he had
given the stock to the purported donee. However, the court asserted that the
claimant had insufficient evidence of "just when, where or under what cir-
cumstances such declarations were made, or when such gift was in fact
made."2"
22. Pa. Laws 1911, 126.
23. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 8-307. The comment to this section states that
the Stock Transfer Act rule has been altered; as between the parties transfer is now
complete upon delivery of security.
Where a security in registered form has been delivered to a purchaser without
a necessary indorsement he may become a bona fide purchaser only as of the
time the indorsement is supplied, but against the transferor the transfer is
complete upon delivery and the purchaser has a specifically enforceable right to
have any necessary indorsement supplied.
Accord, Mechem, Gifts of Corporation Shares, 20 ILL. L. REv. 9, 18-19 (1925).
24. 332 Pa. 168, 172, 2 A.2d 719, 721 (1938).
25. Id. at 174, 2 A.2d at 721.
26. Id. at 173, 2 A.2d at 721.
27. 368 Pa. 379, 83 A.2d 907 (1951).
28. Id. at 383-84, 83 A.2d at 908-09. Tomayko appears to be one of the "hard" cases
1964]
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Such stock certificates are often kept in safe deposit boxes because of
their physical characteristics. The effect of owning these deposit boxes jointly
in relation to delivery is very complicated and frequently litigated. In Tomayko,
the court explained:
The fact that decedent and claimant had joint access to the safe deposit
box is not evidence of a complete gift to the latter. A joint lease of a
safe deposit box is not of itself sufficient to establish joint ownership
of securities found therein which originally belonged to one of the
leases.
29
In Connell's Estate, this was found to be sufficient delivery.80 However, in that
case the donor and donee were husband and wife, and as between closely
related parties, the courts may assume that there was an intention to give.
31
The court in Tomayko was split four to three, however, Justice Jones,
in a vigorous dissent joined by Justices Bell and Chidsey, stated there is no
dispute as to the majority's contention that a joint lease of a safe deposit box
is not of itself sufficient to establish joint ownership of securities found therein.
He further stated that the validity of an executed gift is not impaired by the
donor having access to the safe deposit box where the gift is kept or, "if shares
of stock ... continue to stand in his name.
'8 2
Thus far it is evident that delivery of stock certificates themselves present
many varied and difficult fact situations. However, it should be noted that
Pennsylvania holds with the majority rule, that a valid gift may be made by
delivery of the certificate, "accompanied by words of absolute and present gift,
without any written assignment or indorsement, although the certificate is
made transferrable only on the books of the corporation. '"3 3
to which Mechem so often refers.
The impression appears to prevail in some quarters that the rule requiring de-
livery is an arbitrary and unnecessary formality. This ari'ses . . . both from the
sentimental considerations always aroused by individual hard cases, and from
difficulty encountered in the cases where special circumstances make delivery
difficult or impossible.
Mechem, The Requirement of Delivery in Gifts or Chattels and of Choses-in-Action
Evidenced by Commercial Instruments, 21 ILL. L. REV. 341, 350 (1926).
29. 368 Pa. at 385, 83 A.2d at 909-10.
It has been repeatedly and uniformly held in this and other jurisdictions that
prior or contemporaneous declarations of an alleged donor are admissible to
show that a particular transaction was not intended as a gift, intent being a
distinct and essential element of a gift.
Nolan v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 326 Ill. App. 328, 349, 61 N.E.2d 876, 885 (1945).
30. 282 Pa. at 559-60, 128 Ati. 504-05.
31. In re Chapple's Estate, 332 Pa. 168, 2 A.2d 719 (1938).
Where the deposit by a person is in the name of himself or another, not his
wife, the presumption is that it was done for the purpose of convenience only,
and this presumption is strengthened by the illness or infirmity of the depositor.
38 C.J.S. Gifts § 50.
32. Tomayko v. Carson, 368 Pa. 379, 386, 83 A.2d 907, 912 (1951); 17 P.L.E.
Gifts § 25 (1959).




TRANSFERS BY WRITTEN ASSIGNMENT
The common law has reluctantly yielded to the recognition of gifts of
stock effected through written assignments. 34 In Reese v. Philadelphia Trust,
Safe Deposit & Ins. Co.,3 5 the donor signed assignments of several securities
in blank, with like powers of attorney to sell, assign, and transfer the same for
the assignee's use. Immediately following the transfer of the securities, the
donee deputized the donor to have access to the safe where the stocks were
kept. Subsequent to this deputation, the donor sold some of the securities and
collected dividends and interest from others which she deposited in her own
account. The court, nevertheless, found this to be a valid gift, overruling the
lower court. The lower court's decision was contrary because it had extended
the "inquiry and allowed what had subsequently occurred to overcome the
plain and obvious intendment of what was said and done when the gift was
made."
36
Although the agency relationship between the donor and donee can be
used to explain a part of the control exercised by her, the fact that the donor
was the donee's aunt explains why the court found a valid gift. The facts
could have easily been interpreted otherwise, and probably would have, had
there not been a family relationship.
The problem in Connell's Estate as to the validity under the Uniform
Stock Transfer Act of a transfer of unindorsed stocks arose in a similar
situation with regard to a transfer by written assignments unaccompanied by
the stocks.37 Section 301 presented the courts with the possibility of having
to negate any subsequent assignment not accompanied by the certificates. Since
there were many times when a donor could not conveniently transfer the
stocks with the certificates, a strict construction of this rule seemed sure to
invalidate many attempted gifts by assignment.
However, the courts did not strictly construe section 301. In Millard
Estate,38 decedent-donor executed an assignment and power Of attorney while
he was in Florida. The certificates he intended to assign were in his safe
deposit box in Pennsylvania. Therefore, the donor gave the assignments,
transferring the 6,900 shares of stock to the six respondents, to his son-in-
law who conveyed them to the secretary of the issuing corporation for the
34. Allen-West Co. v. Grumbles, 129 Fed. 287 (8th Cir. 1904). But see, In re
Vance, 106 Pa. Super. 467, 162 Atl. 346 (1932).
35. Reese v. Phila. Trust, Safe Deposit & Ins. Co., 218 Pa. 150, 67 At. 124 (1907).
36. Id. at 157, 67 Atl. at 127.
37. Section 301 of the Uniform Stock Transfer Act, enacted in Pennsylvania in
1911, stated that title to a certificate and the share represented thereby could be trans-
ferred only (a) by delivery of an indorsed certificate or (b) by delivery of the certificate
and a separate written assignment or a power of attorney to sell signed by the owner
of shares. Pa. Laws 1911, 126.
38. 77 Pa. D. & C. 97 (Orphans' Ct. 1951) noted in 13 U. PiTT. L. REV. 165 (1951).
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purpose of transferring the shares upon the books of the corporation. The
certificates were not transferred on the books of the corporation because
the shares were locked in the donor's safe deposit box. The donor died before
the transfer could be completed on the books of the corporation. The effect
of the Uniform Stock Transfer Act on gifts of stock by assignment was one of
first impression in this case. The court concurred with the Connell's case,
saying that the provisions of the Uniform Stock Transfer Act of 1911 are
"for the purpose of protecting the corporation only, and the title passes be-
tween the parties when the certificate is handed over, and the other essential
elements of a gift are present. '3 9 The court went on to state that "it is apparent
that the intention of the decedent was to make a valid gift inter vivos, and was
accompanied by a constructive or symbolic delivery of the stock certificates
by the execution and delivery of the assignments.
'40
In Brightbill v. Boeshore,41 the decedent assigned stocks to his daughter,
and then delivered them to her, making no changes on the books of the cor-
poration. The certificates were placed in a deposit box which the donor and
donee had equal access to; the donor received and retained dividends from the
securities in question; he voted on the stock; the tax returns showed that
decedent-donor represented he was owner of the stocks; and finally, the donor
asked his daughter to put the stocks up for collateral. The supreme court
found this to be a valid gift inter vivos. Although the assignment was accom-
panied by delivery of the certificates, it is significant that the court did not
mention the Uniform Stock Transfer Act or the Uniform Commercial Code
and therefore, did not discuss whether this transfer complied with their pro-
visions.
42
In both Millard's Estate and Brightbill, there was a family relationship
between the donor and donee. However, if the parties involved had not been
related, there would have been little reason for the courts to uphold the gift.
The cases in Pennsylvania dealing with written assignments of stock
indicate that the law regards the delivery of the certificates as sufficient legal
39. 77 Pa. D. & C. at 103. The court bases this statement on In re Cohn, 187
App. Div. 392, 176 N.Y.Supp. 225 (1919) ; Re Valentine, 204 N.Y.Supp. 284 (1924);
Harris v. Harris, 222 Ill. App. 164 (1921). No reference was made as to the purpose of
the Uniform Stock Transfer Act in any of these cases. However, it is significant that the
assignments of stock without the certificates were upheld in all three cases even though
both states had previously enacted the Uniform Stock Transfer Act.
40. 77 Pa. D. & C. at 103.
41. 385 Pa. 69, 122 A.2d 38 (1956).
42. It has been indicated that delivery of a separate written assignment is
sufficient delivery for execution of a gift of stock, without delivery of the cer-
tificates. Such indications must be considered in the light of the new provisions
of the Uniform Commercial Code, but these provisions are presumably intended
to protect the issuer and not necessarily to control the rights of the parties, for
such was the attitude of the courts toward the Uniform Stock Transfer Act.
P.L.E. Gifts § 25 (1959).
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delivery to make a valid gift. In summary, delivery may be made by assign-
ment of the certificate and manual delivery thereof to the donee; by an assign-
ment, surrender and cancellation of the old certificate and delivery of a new
issue to the donee; by the manual delivery of the certificate without indorse-
ment with a written assignment; and by a written assignment alone.
43
TRANSFER ON THE BOOKS OF THE ISSUING CORPORATION
Delivery of the stock certificates or a transfer of a written assignment
satisfy the common law reason for requiring the rule, i.e., a convenient test for
objectively proving the gift transaction. The changing of names on the books
of a corporation would never have satisfied the common law requirement for
delivery. Assuming the other requirements for a gift have been met,44 it is
easy to understand why the weight of authority holds that a transfer of the
stock to the donee on the corporate books is not essential to a valid gift. Al-
though a gift is not defeated by not making a transfer on the books, the majority
rule is that a "transfer of securities from the donor to the donee on the cor-
porate books, standing alone, is not sufficient to constitute a valid gift .... ,,45
Pennsylvania belongs to the minority, however, with regard to transfers
on the books sufficing as delivery. In the leading case of Robert's Appeal,46
the testator-donor had stocks transferred on the books of the corporation to
his wife's niece. He retained the certificates in his possession, and after his
death, the stocks were found in an envelope indorsed with his niece's name
and his own. In a frequently quoted decision the court said:
[TIransferring the shares to her upon the books of the company is
putting her in complete possession of the thing assigned, and clothing
her with the complete legal title. It stands in the place of a delivery....
There can be no clearer evidence of a design to part with the right
of property in favor of another than an absolute transfer of the legal
title to her for her own use .... The best evidence of her ownership is
the transfer on the books of the company. 47
The leading case contra to Robert's Appeal is Besson v. Stevess. 48 In
Besson, the testator-donor made a transfer on the books of a corporation to
his daughter. Certificates issued in the name of the daughter that were never
43. Ibid. Accord, In Re Szabo's Estate, 10 N.Y.S.2d 94, 176 N.E.2d 395 (1961) ; 12A
FLETCHER, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 5683 (rev. ed. 1957) ; Mechem, Gifts of Corporation
Shares, 20 ILL. L. REV. 9 (1925); Comment, 7 WAYNE L. REv. 571 (1961).
44. FLETCHER, 12A PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 5684 (rev. ed. 1957).
45. Ibid. But see, Figuers v. Sherrell, 181 Tenn. 87, 178 S.W.2d 629 (1944), where
the court stated that the authorities were rather evenly divided on the question of
transfer on the books being sufficient delivery.
46. 85 Pa. 84 (1877) ; accord, Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Ward, 322 Ill. 126, 163
N.E. 319 (1928) ; Thomas v. Thomas, 70 Colo. 29, 197 Pac. 243 (1921).
47. 85 Pa. at 87.
48. 94 N.J. Eq. 549, 120 Atl. 640 (1923).
19641
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actually received by her, were placed by the secretary of the corporation in
the testator's private compartment in the corporation's safe. There was no
consideration given for these transfers. Later the daughter executed and
delivered to the testator an assignment of the stocks and an irrevocable power
of attorney authorizing the transfer of the stocks on the books to the testator.
The controversy was between the executors of the father and daughter to
determine ownership of the stock. The executors of the daughter argued that
it would be absurd to require an actual delivery to the daughter and a re-
delivery by her, if she intended her father to manage the stock for her. The
court said although the requirement of delivery may be absurd in exceptional
cases, it rests "upon reasons of public policy, for the general good, to which
the inconvenience of a few must yield."'49 This court clearly recognized that
it was in conflict with Robert's Appeal:
The question of legal sufficiency, as an act of delivery, of the issuance
by the company of a new stock certificate without delivery thereof
to the transferee, seems never to have been decided heretofore in this
state; but I think the conclusion as to its insufficiency in that behalf
necessarily flows from the application to the facts of the well-estab-
lished principles of the law of gifts inter vivos. It is, of course, in con-
flict with the decision in In re Robert's .... 50
Courts have attempted to analogize corporate records of stock transfers
to the recording of real estate deeds. The Supreme Court of Minnesota stated
such an analogy, adding that "it is significant to note that the act of recording
a real estate deed merely raises a presumption of the deed's delivery."'51 The
Supreme Court of Tennessee followed this view when it declared the law of that
state to be different than that of Robert's Appeal:
Such is not the law in Tennessee. . . . [T]his court has held that the
title to shares of stock, both legal and equitable, follows lawful pos-
session of the certificate and has refused in so many words to give the
stock book of a corporation any such force as is given the public
records in the register's office in determining questions of title.
52
Thus, as between the parties thereto, many jurisdictions hold that the com-
49. Id. at 567, 120 At. at 646.
In a given case, where the donative intent is clearly proved but there has been
for one reason or another, no delivery, it seems hard and technical to fail to
enforce the gift. The question must be viewed broadly, however. One must ask,
not what's to be thought of a given case, but whether on the whole it is de-
sirable that gifts . . . shall validly be made without more being done than the
speaking of words.
Mechem, supra note 28, at 350.
50. 94 N.J. Eq. at 567, 120 Atl. at 646; accord, In re Bush's Trust, 249 Minn. 36,
81 N.W.2d 615 (1957) ; Figuers v. Sherrell, 181 Tenn. 87, 178 S.W.2d 629 (1944)
Hudgers v. Tillman, 227 Ala. 672, 151 So. 863 (1933).
51. In re Bush's Trust, supra note 50, at 44, 81 N.W.2d at 623.
52. Figuers v. Sherrell, 181 Tenn. 87, 93, 178 S.W.2d 629, 631 (1944).
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pletion of a sale or a gift cannot be made to depend upon entries on the books
of a corporation, where its shares of stock are involved.
53
There is some question as to whether Robert's Appeal is still the law in
Pennsylvania, for Justice Bell has commented:
It is unnecessary to discuss or further review the many authorities
on this subject because they have so recently been reviewed in the
majority and dissenting opinions in Elliott's Estate . . . [C]hadrow
v. Kellman . . .Furjanick's Estate . . . Brightbill v. Boeshore ....
These recent cases would seem to impliedly overrule, although they
do not say so, Robert's Appeal ... and Reap v. Wyoming Valley Trust
Co .... 54
Although this statement seems to be a very formidable barrier to one relying
on Robert's Appeal to support a gift made by a transfer on the books, an anal-
ysis of these cases putatively overruling Robert's Appeal will show otherwise.
The only case cited by Justice Bell that involved a transfer of stock to a
donee in his own name was Brightbill. However, this case did not involve an
attempted gift by a transfer of names on the corporation books, but rather by
an assignment and delivery of the stock certificates.5 5 In addition, Brightbill
was the only case in which the donor did not retain an undivided interest in
the rights transferred, and was the only case in which the title in question
was that of stock certificates.5 6 In Martella Estate,57 the stocks in question were
made out in the name of the decedent and his son as "joint tenants with a right
of survivorship and not as tenants in common."58 They were on the cor-
poration's books as jointly owned, not as the son being a sole owner. The
alleged gift involved no transfer on the books but resulted from the original
entry. It appears the certificates of stock were never solely in the donee's name.
Thus, it can be stated that the donor neither relinquished complete control
nor did he clothe the owner with complete legal title. In light of these distinc-
tions the validity of Robert's Appeal remains intact.
McClements v. McClements" reaffirms Robert's Appeal as the law in
this area of gifts. Gertrude K. McClements brought an action in equity to have
seventy-five shares of corporate stock held by her sons, the donees, charged
with a constructive trust for her benefit. The sons claimed they received the
53. Id. at 94, 178 S.W.2d at 632; Nolan v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 326 Ill. App.
328, 61 N.E.2d 876 (1945) (defense claimed the transfer was to a daughter as nominee
and not a gift) ; In re Heller's Estate, 210 Wis. 550, 246 N.W. 683 (1933).
54. Martella Estate, 390 Pa. 255, 261, 135 A.2d 372, 374 (1957).
55. 385 Pa. 69, 122 A.2d 38.
56. Chadrow v. Kellman, 378 Pa. 237, 106 A.2d 584 (1954) (joint savings account)
Elliott Estate, 378 Pa. 495, 106 A.2d 453 (1954) (joint certificates of deposit) ; Furjanick
Estate, 375 Pa. 484, 100 A.2d 85 (1933) (joint bank account).
57. 390 Pa. 255, 135 A.2d 372, (1957).
58. Id. at 257, 135 A.2d at 372 (dictum).
59. 411 Pa. 257, 191 A.2d 814 (1963).
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stock as a gift from their father who transferred the registration of the owner-
ship to one of the sons instructing that it was to be distributed among them.
Mrs. McClements argued that although ownership of the stock had been trans-
ferred on the corporation's books, there was no evidence of actual delivery of
the certificates of ownership from the father to his sons. She further contended
that this is a decisive fact and "in order to effectuate a valid gift inter vivos,
such [a] delivery was essential." 60 The court through Justice Eagen stated:
"Under certain circumstances, the transfer of the registration of stock owner-
ship on the books of the corporation in itself constitutes a legal and sufficient
delivery." 61 Thus, it can be concluded that Robert's Appeal continues to be
recognized in Pennsylvania.62
GIFTS AND JOINT OWNERSHIP OF STOCK
The very nature of stocks and joint tenancies preclude a complete delivery.
The Superior Court of Pennsylvania recognized this problem when it stated:
To make a valid gift there must have been not only an intention to
make it but to do so at the time and not in the future, and it must be
accompanied by an actual or constructive delivery to the donee by
which the donor released all dominion over the property and invested
the donee with a full control and title to the same. Without a complete
delivery there can be no valid gift inter vivos, though every step be
taken that is essential to the validity of the gift; if there is no delivery
the gift must fail. Intention cannot supply it; words cannot supply it;
actions cannot supply it; it is an indispensable requisite without which
the gift fails, regardless of the consequences, and the test of delivery is
the change of property, the immediate right to the entire dominion
over the subject of the gift, a perfect title which is good against the
donor or anyone else.
63
"Ay, there's the rub !"64 The owner of stock cannot divest himself of all
dominion and control over the property when by the nature of the gift itself,
he must necessarily retain some control. 65 Although Chadrow v. Kellman66
involved the contents of a safe deposit box, by analogy, its law can be applied
to our dilemma in stock transfers. Justice Bell, one of the three dissenters,
60. Id. at 261, 191 A.2d at 816.
61. Ibid. It is some significance that Justice Bell, who wrote the majority's opinion
in the Martella case, joined the majority in McClements which seems to reaffirm the
decision in Robert's Appeal.
62. 17 P.L.E. Gifts § 25 (1959). It is interesting to note that the English courts
consider transfers on the books sufficient delivery. Mechem, Gifts of Corporation Shares,
20 ILL. L. REV. 9, 24 (1925).
63. Chadrow v. Kellman, 378 Pa. 237, 106 A.2d 594 (1954); Tradesmen's Nat.
Bank & Trust Co. v. Forshey, 162 Pa. Super. 71, 56 A.2d 329, 331 (1948).
64. Shakespeare, Hamlet, act iii, scene I.




argued that it is impossible for the donor to divest himself of all dominion
and control and vest the donee with complete dominion and control "over a
joint account or joint box or interest, and still have each party possess a
joint dominion and control. '67 Justice Bell further pointed out that delivery
is confused with possession, and actual possession is made necessary where
the right to possession or constructive possession would be sufficient. "Actual
possession is not necessary under any authorities."68 Finally, he suggests a
rule for joint tenancies different from that applicable to ordinary gifts inter
vivos. Such a rule would not require the donor to divest himself of all dominion
and control, "but merely the divesture by the donor and investure in the donee
of so much dominion and control as is consonant with a joint ownership, title
or interest in the subject matter of the gift."69
Two lower court cases illustrate this problem of dominion and control.
In Fey Estate,70 the deceased wife executed a written assignment of the stocks
to herself and her husband by a notation on the association's books. The
stocks were then put in a deposit box, permitting both equal access. The court
held that such an assignment constituted an inter vivos gift of the stock, en-
titling her husband to full ownership of the stocks upon the death of the wife.
The court so held regardless of the fact that the certificates were never indorsed
or delivered to the association, and no request was ever made to the association
to issue new certificates.
Although a contrary decision resulted in Parkhurst's Estate,71 the court
did adopt the rule suggested by Justice Bell for determining gifts where joint
tenancies are involved. The donor-decedent purchased the stock with his own
funds and registered them in both his and his niece's name as joint tenants
with the right of survivorship. The donor then rented a safe deposit box in
his own name and placed the certificates therein. Thereafter he switched this
box with the one held jointly with the donee. Both donor and donee had access
to the box. Later the niece delivered the certificates to a bank to be put in a
custodian account of the decedent. In addition, she delivered and executed to
her uncle blank stock powers, permitting him to deal with the stock as if he
were sole owner. Although the certificates still remained in joint names, they
could not be taken from this account without the decedent's express authoriza-
tion. The decedent's account also received the dividends from the stock.
The court's finding was based primarily on the fact that the decedent
retained sole and complete control of the stocks during his lifetime, and that
67. Id. at 251, 106 A.2d at 601-02.
68. Ibid.
69. Ibid.
70. 2 Pa. D. & C.2d 279 (Orphans' Ct. 1954).
71. 20 Pa. D. & C.2d 761 (Orphans' Ct. 1960).
19641
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
the certificates were in his possession at death. It is submitted the decedent
did not have sole control, if it was necessary for him to have blank powers from
his niece before he could sell the stock.
Parkhurst appears to be one of the "hard" cases which are often spoken
of in the law of gifts. Martella Estate72 formed the basis of the decision for
the majority, but as Judge Lefever stated in his dissent, factual distinctions
are decisive in these cases and the facts of Parkhurst differed greatly from
those of Martella.73 More than a change of ownership on the corporation's
books from the 'sole proprietorship to joint ownership with the right of survivor-
ship should be required for gifts of stock. The problem is determining exactly
what more should be required.
74
Gifts involving contents of safe deposit boxes or savings or checking
accounts held as joint tenancies involve many of the same problems as those
of stocks. This area is also burdened with the same indefiniteness as to what
is necessary to complete a gift.
75
An attorney following the twisted path of the law through the varied
factual situations presented by gifts of chattels cannot help but be perplexed.
He can only hope that he has presented the facts meeting the precise desiderata
which will lead the court to find the law as he desires. Since the end of World
War II American society has become extremely fluid. Families are no longer
satisfied to remain in their hometown; they are generally scattered throughout
the states. 76 Therefore, the strict rules for delivery should be revised. To
demand some type of manual delivery to effect a gift, which could be completed
otherwise without fear of fraud, is unrealistic. These impracticalities can be
illustrated by the situation where a father lives in Pennsylvania, his son in
California, and his daughter in Texas. What actions will meet the delivery
requirement? Manual delivery is difficult. It is probable that the father will
assume a transfer as joint tenants is sufficient. Yet, the decisions are so equivocal
that an attorney could not give advice without fear of being proved wrong. It is
evident that the norms of manual tradition of the object or possession in the
donee are not sufficiently flexible to cover today's needs. Hard cases seem to be
the rule, not the exception. Too often the intent of the donor is defeated by
meticulous legalities.
To criticize the rule without offering a remedy may be fruitless. How-
ever, two approaches have been suggested. One is to accept the possession or
72. 390 Pa. 255, 135 A.2d 372 (1957).
73. Parkhurst Estate (No. 2), 20 Pa. D. & C.2d 761 (Orphans' Ct. 1960).
74. Id. at 786.
75. Sivak Estate, 409 Pa. 261, 185 A.2d 778 (1962) ; King Estate, 387 Pa. 119, 126
A.2d 463 (1956) ; Furjanick Estate, 375 Pa. 484, 100 A.2d 85 (1963).
76. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 37-38
(1963); WHYTE, THE ORGANIZATION MAN, ch. 21 (1956).
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dominion theory and append to it specific exceptions as might be deemed
worthwhile to recognize. This seems to be the position taken by most courts,
with the exceptions causing most of the problems. Another approach is to
eliminate "the necessity for delivery, or finding the necessary delivery to be
present, in any case where certain desiderata are achieved without manual
tradition."'77 It is submitted that it is time for the legislature to enact a law
covering the field of gifts of stock similar to the uniform laws dealing with
stock transfers. The donor needs judicial or legislative assistance to more
accurately effectuate his expressed desires regarding his property.
78
JAMES T. REILLY
77. Rohan, The Continuing Question of Delivery in the Law of Gifts, 38 IND. L.J.
1, 8 (1902).
78. Id. at 18.
